Applying this test to Lucas's case, the Court found it unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented Lucas from building on his land, but left judgment on the issue to the South Carolina Supreme Court on remand. Id TheSouthCaroIinaCoastal Council's burden on remand, the Court noted, is to "identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] The Court then addressed Respondents' contention that Congress was silent with regard to damages in both the text and the legislative history of the statute. The Court noted that because Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) , held that Title IX did not provide for an express right of action, it was not surprising that the statute was silent regarding remedies. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. The Court asserted that it was necessary to look to the state of the law when Congress passed Title IX to determine whether remedies were available. Id. at 1036. In so doing, the Court held that the traditional presumption in favor of remedies existed at the time Title IX was enacted, and that neither subsequent case law nor statutes had altered the presumption. Id. Damages, therefore, were available for an action brought pursuant to Title IX. Id. at 1036-37.
The Respondents also argued that an award of damages would violate the doctrine of separation of powers, that the presumption in favor of damages did not apply when Congress enacts a statute pursuant to its Spending Clause power, and that if damages were available, they should be limited to backpay and prospective relief. Id. at 1037. In rejecting the argument that a damages award would violate the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court asserted that the discretion to award relief did not increase judicial power or impinge on areas that were reserved to the executive and legislative branches. Id. The doctrine of separation of powers would actually be hanned if courts were permitted to decide against awarding damages, as such adjudication would frustrate and make useless causes of action authorized by Congress. Id.
Continuing its analysis, the Court rejected the argument that the traditional presumption should not apply to statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power. The Court also declined to limit the remedy under the statute to backpay and prospective relief, because they were inappropriate and insufficient. Id. at 1038. The remedy of back pay was useless here because Ms. Franklin was a student at the time of the violation, and prospective relief was insufficient because Ms. Franklin no longer attended public school and Hill no longer taught at the school. Id. In addition, such limitations abandoned the traditional approach of allowing courts to decide the extent of remedies when a federal right has been violated. Id.
By holding that damages were available to enforce an action pursuant to Title IX, the Franklin court emphasized the importance of providing remedies for wrongs committed in violation offederal statutes. Because of the diversity on the Supreme Court, unanimous decisions are rare. Thus, on the heels of Justice Thomas's nomination hearings and the publicity and awareness that the proceeding brought to the issue of sexual harassment, it appears that the issue of sexual harassment may have been a significant factor in the Court's decision. Nevertheless, to rule otherwise would have left Ms. Franklin and others similarly situated without any practical recourse under the law. While this decision will most likely increase the amount of sexual harassment cases litigated, hopefully it will serve as a deterrent as well.
- In 1989, Barbara Hafer ran for the position of Auditor General of Pennsylvania. While campaigning, it was alleged that Hafer was given a list of twenty-one employees in the Auditor General's office who had secured their jobs through payments to a fonner employee. Hafer had promised to fire the people on the list ifshe was elected. After winning the election, Hafer fired eighteen people on the list, including James Melo, Jr., on the grounds that they had "bought" their jobs.
Melo and seven others filed suit against Hafer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
